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MANDATORY MEDIATION OF COASTAL
ZONE PLANNING DISPUTES IN ALASKA-
AN INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING
I. INTRODUCTION
Alaska's coastal zone management program' incorporates a
novel provision mandating mediation between the state's Coastal
Policy Council and individual coastal resource districts when all or
part of a coastal management program submitted by a district is
found to be deficient under state program standards. 2 Coastal zone
management is an extremely complex field requiring extensive coor-
dination among local, state, and federal agencies. The allocation
and protection of coastal resources tend to be hotly contested by a
wide range of interested parties. Consequently, development of
coastal management programs is often attended by controversy at
every stage of the regulatory process, and disagreements between the
state and local districts are likely to develop. 3
Alaska's coastal zone mediation statute reflects a nationwide
movement to expand the use of mediation beyond the traditional
collective bargaining context to many other types of disputes.4 In
Alaska, coastal planning mediation is only one facet of a statewide
Copyright © 1984 by Alaska Law Review
1. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40 (1982); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, §§ 80.010-.900
(Apr. 1984); id §§ 85.010-.900.
2. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.06(b) (1982); ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170
(Apr. 1984).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 13-14. Indeed, the mediation provision
itself was developed in response to one such controversy which resulted in the with-
drawal of a district program from Council consideration in the face of almost-
certain rejection and a subsequent long delay in implementation of a revised pro-
gram. Telephone interview with William R. Ross, Associate Director for Fisheries
and the Environment, Office of the Governor, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 1983).
4. The search for alternative means of dispute resolution has developed largely
in response to perceived overloading of the judicial system, as well as dissatisfaction
with the costs and results of litigation. See, e.g., Edwards, The Rising Work Load
and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts. A Causation-Based Approach to
the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IowA L. REv. 871 (1983); Sander, Varieties
of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
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mediation project currently being established within the Office of the
Governor.5 In other states, mediation has been used increasingly in
recent years to resolve environmental disputes, which characteristi-
cally present issues and dynamics similar to those which arise in
coastal zone planning.6 Negotiation techniques such as mediation
also have been proposed as possible supplements to traditional ad-
ministrative rulemaking procedures.7 Alaska's system of mediation
for coastal zone planning draws heavily on the labor mediation
model but also shares elements of these later developments. While
the system is structured as part of a regulatory process, the disputes
triggering mediation are likely to reflect strong substantive conflicts
about the proper management of coastal resources. Alaska's use of
mediation places it among the small group of states pioneering the
institutionalization of the mediation process outside of the labor
management field. 8
The purpose of this note is to examine the significance and po-
tential effectiveness of Alaska's system of coastal zone management
mediation. After a brief introduction to coastal zone management
issues and procedures in Section II, Alaska's mediation provision
will be examined from two basic perspectives. Section III will de-
5. The project will operate within the Office of Management and Budget's
Governmental Coordination Office and will be funded partially by a grant from the
National Institute for Dispute Resolution. Project functions will include dispute
evaluation and screening, mediator training, and public education and consultation.
The Office of the Attorney General strongly supports the Mediation Project as one
means of relieving pressure on the judicial system. Telephone interview with Joe
Geldhof, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General (Aug. 28,
1984).
For a summary of additional mediation developments in Alaska, primarily in
the areas of divorce and child custody disputes, see L. FREEDMAN, LEGISLATION ON
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 3-16 (ABA Special Committee on Dispute Resolution Mono-
graph No. 2, 1984).
6. See infra notes 39-69 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
8. No other state requires mediation of coastal zone management regulations,
although mediation has been used on a limited basis in New Jersey to seek consen-
sus on data needs for coastal planning. See Straus, Mediating Environmental, En-
ergy, and Economic Tradeoffs: A Search for Improved Tools for Coastal Zone
Planning, in ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS 123 (L.
Lake ed. 1980).
Several other states provide for negotiation, if not expressly for mediation, of
hazardous waste facility siting disputes. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 144.445 (West
Cum. Supp. 1983).
The most common application of mediation to non-labor disputes has been the
establishment of local dispute resolution centers to resolve relatively small civil dis-
putes outside the judicial system. For a listing of such programs, see L. FREEDMAN,
STATE LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ABA Special Committee on Alter-
native Means of Dispute Resolution Monograph No. 1, 1982).
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velop an analytical framework within which Alaska's system can be
compared to three other models of mediation practice: traditional
labor mediation, environmental mediation, and regulatory negotia-
tion/mediation. These models offer useful insights by which to eval-
uate the Alaska scheme. Section IV will examine the specific
regulations governing Alaska's mediation process in terms of their
practical feasibility, consistency with other regulations, and vulnera-
bility to judicial attack. Finally, overall conclusions concerning the
regulations and their implications for expanded use of mediation in
Alaska government and resource management will be presented in
Section V.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM AND RELATED ISSUES
A. Coastal Zone Management Program Structure
Ultimate responsibility for coastal zone management in Alaska
is vested in the Coastal Policy Council (the Council), an appointive
body operating within the Office of the Governor. Council member-
ship is structured to represent nine geographic regions of the state, as
well as the various state agencies whose substantive responsibilities
include coastal matters.9 The administrative office responsible for
day-to-day management of the program is the Office of Coastal
Management (OCM) within the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB). The Council and the OCM coordinate and supervise the
development and administration of comprehensive management
programs developed by local coastal resource districts.10 The district
programs set forth the allowed and prohibited coastal land uses and
permit requirements and are the chief mechanisms of coastal zone
management. District programs must conform to state guidelines,1'
which in turn must comply with the federal Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Act (CZMA).12
The potential for conflict among competing interests, and the
variety of issues inherent in coastal zone planning, are evidenced by
the diverse objectives of the statutory program. 13 A "full and fair
9. ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.155 (Supp. 1983).
10. Id §§44.19.161-162.
11. Id § 46.40.030 (1982); ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 6, § 85 (Apr. 1984).
12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976 & Supp. 1980). For a brief overview of CZMA
provisions and issues, see generally ELIOPOULOS, COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT:
PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS (Env't. Rep. (BNA) Monograph No. 30, 1982); Wein-
berg, Coastal Area Legislation: Taking Arms Against a Sea of Troubles, 6 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 317 (1983).
13. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.020 (1982). The goals which must be accommodated
are: use, management, and enhancement of overall environmental quality; develop-
ment of industrial or commercial enterprises; use and protection of coastal area re-
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evaluation of all demands" on coastal lands and waters must be
achieved. 14 The difficulty of accommodating and balancing these
objectives is compounded by the state's dual role as both an arbitra-
tor among competing claimants for use of coastal resources and a
proprietor and user of coastal areas in its own right.' 5
Detailed guidelines and procedures for the development of dis-
trict coastal management programs are set forth in sections
46.40.040-.090 of the Alaska Code. Extensive public notification and
comment activities are required to ensure that district planners con-
sult and consider the views of all interested parties in the district,
including those of adjacent government bodies and state and federal
agencies. 16 After this process is completed, the district program is
submitted to the OCM for review and recommendations, and a final
determination on its acceptability is made by the Council.17 At this
stage, the mediation process which is the subject of this note may be
triggered.
B. Overview of Mediation Requirements
Alaska's Coastal Zone Management statute provides:
[If] the council finds that a district coastal management program is
not approvable or is approvable only in part . . .. it shall direct
that deficiencies in the program submitted by the coastal resource
district be mediated. In mediating the deficiencies, the council
may call for one or more public hearings in the district. The coun-
cil shall meet with officials of the coastal resource district in order
to resolve differences.' 8
Specific procedures for the conduct of the mediation are outlined in
title 6, section 86.170 of the Alaska Administrative Code. The stat-
ute limits the parties involved in the mediation to the Council and
the district. The parties mutually may agree on a mediator, but if
they are unable to agree within ten days, they must request a media-
tor from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS).
The Council may hold public hearings on the issues before media-
tion begins, and the record of any such hearing must be made avail-
sources; protection of land and water uses which are particularly dependent on the
coastal location; protection of significant historic, cultural, and esthetic values; pre-
vention of damage caused by inconsistent land or water uses adjacent to sensitive
areas; and recognition of energy supply needs.
14. Id
15. Cf. Kuersteiner, Sullivan & Temin, Protecting Our Coastal Interests. A Pol-
icy Proposal for Coordinating Coastal Zone Management, Natural Defense, and the
Federal Supremacy Doctrine, 8 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 705, 706 (1980).
16. ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.130 (Apr. 1984).
17. Id § 85.150.
18. ALASKA STAT. § 46.40.060(b) (1982). APA procedures are codified at id
§§ 44.62.010-.650 (1982).
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able to the mediator. The mediator is given wide latitude in setting
rules and scheduling the mediation sessions, but an agreement must
be reached within sixty to ninety days. Failure to meet this deadline,
or to obtain an earlier certification by the mediator that the parties
are at an impasse, will terminate the mediation process. At this
point, the Council must call for a public hearing and make findings
as prescribed by Alaska's Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' 9
Following the adjudicatory hearing, the Council is empowered to di-
rect that the district plan be amended and adopted in accordance
with its findings.20 These statutory provisions will be discussed in
detail in Section IV below. Before considering the specifics of the
process, however, it is useful to compare Alaska's coastal dispute res-
olution scheme with other applications of the mediation process.
III. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVE - TRADITIONAL AND
ALTERNATIVE APPLICATIONS OF MEDIATION
A. Definition and Fundamental Characteristics of the Process
Mediation is a dispute settlement process involving intervention
between conflicting parties in order to promote reconciliation, settle-
ment, compromise, or understanding. 2' Mediation is distinguished
from simple negotiation by the presence of a skilled and neutral
facilitator who has the confidence of the disputing parties and works
to bring them to a mutually acceptable agreement. Mediation is dis-
tinguished from more coercive techniques, such as arbitration or liti-
gation, by the fact that participation is purely voluntary, and that
agreement must be created and enforced by the parties.22 Unlike
litigation, mediation is extremely flexible; as one commentator has
observed, "one is tempted to say that it is all process and no struc-
ture. '23 Although this note does not attempt to provide a compre-
hensive summary of mediation techniques and dynamics,24 specific
points relevant to Alaska's coastal zone mechation system will be ex-
amined below.
B. Labor Mediation
The most established application of mediation is in the negotia-
19. Id § 46.40.060(b).
20. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(c) (Apr. 1984).
21. WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INT'L DICTIONARY (P. Gove ed. 1971).
22. Sander, supra note 4, at 115.
23. Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 305, 307
(1971).
24. For a general overview of negotiation dynamics and techniques, see R.
FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
NEGOTIATION (1982).
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tion of labor union contracts, and the public most often associates
mediation with this setting. The labor model of mediation must
form the starting point for any evaluation of other applications for
several reasons. Not only has labor mediation provided an essential
body of experience and expertise for use in developing other applica-
tions, but the institutional structures developed for the delivery and
evaluation of labor mediation services are an important model.25
Furthermore, alternative mediation applications are usefully ana-
lyzed in terms of the extent to which they share or depart from key
characteristics of the labor model. These characteristics are dis-
cussed briefly below.
Labor mediation takes place between two parties: the union and
the company management. The nature of the parties' relationship
provides several conditions which have been identified as crucial to
the success of mediation. The two parties are bound by mutual in-
terdependence, since neither party can fulfill its goals without reach-
ing some accommodation with the other.26 Further, the parties share
a long-term relationship and are aware that any one set of negotia-
tions constitutes part of a cycle that will repeat itself in the future.27
The parties' ongoing relationship forces them not only to seek short-
term gains but also to create and maintain long-term relations.28
These factors taken together provide a strong incentive to negotiate
in good faith despite the voluntary nature of the process. The most
significant difference between labor mediation and the other models
discussed below is the fact that there are only two parties. Since all
relevant interests are readily identified and present in the negotia-
tions,29 the parties may have confidence in the validity and stability
of the agreement. Moreover, an acceptable level of consensus is eas-
ier to achieve between two parties than it would be in the case of
larger groups with more complex power dynamics.30
Issues in labor mediation tend to be relatively well-defined and
25. The implications of Alaska's reliance on the labor model are discussed infra
at Section IV.
26. Fuller, supra note 23, at 310.
27. Id at 311.
28. Id
29. See Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6
VT. L. REv. 1, 6 n.14 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure/or Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J.
1, 92-93 (1982) (discussing complexities of determining consensus among multiple
parties). Fuller suggests that labor mediation experience indicates that negotiation
cannot succeed among more than two parties, given the likelihood that adding more
parties will shift the mediator's function from that of the neutral balance in a triad
to a more active role. Fuller, supra note 23, at 309, 312-14. However, even Fuller
recognizes the value of "mediative" intervention among larger numbers of dispu-
tants. Id at 334-37 (consultative process appropriate for water resource allocation
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recognized by both parties to the negotiations, although their goals
and priorities naturally may be expected to differ.3 ' The relevant
terms and their implications tend to be well-established and foresee-
able in labor contracts because there is an extensive body of experi-
ence in the negotiation, interpretation, and enforcement of labor
contracts. 32 Further, because of the nature of the parties' relation-
ship and the subject matter of the negotiations, all aspects of the ne-
gotiations are characterized by economic tradeoffs,3 3 and the parties
generally are comfortable in measuring gains and concessions in
economic terms.3 4 In sum, the parties in labor mediation may have
very different goals, but they share a common set of expectations and
standards.
Labor mediation takes place within a well-defined legal and in-
stitutional framework. The use of mediation is recognized by the
Taft-Hartley Act3 5 and many similar state statutes,3 6 and mediation
services are provided and regulated through the FMCS.37 As a re-
suit, parties to labor negotiations typically know when mediation
will be appropriate or required, as well as how mediation services
may be obtained and funded. The parties also have access to a well-
developed body of precedent and standards by which the conduct bf
the negotiations and the legality of resulting agreements may be
judged.38
C. Environmental Mediation
The term "environmental mediation" is applied to the media-
tion of disputes which focus on the proper development, allocation,
and protection of environmental resources.3 9 The development of
disputes). See also Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation:.A Reply to Pro-
fessor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 91 (1981) (any number of parties may participate).
31. See generally Susskind, supra note 29, at 6 n.14.
32. Id
33. Fuller, supra note 23, at 310-11.
34. Susskind & Weinstein, Towards a Theory of Environment Dispute Resolution,
9 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 311, 327 (1980).
35. Taft-Hartley Act § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1978). See generally H. NOR-
THRUP, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN LABOR
DISPUTES 155-62 (1966); Simkin, The hird Seat at the Bargaining Table-A Govern-
ment Point of View, 14 LAB. L.J. 5 (1963).
36. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.190 (1981) (providing for mediation of pub-
lic-sector labor disputes); id § 23.05.060(2) (Alaska Dep't of Labor may act as a
mediator in labor disputes in the interest of industrial peace.).
37. See generally FRES, LABOR DISPUTES § 71 (1977); Susskind, supra note 29,
at 4-5 n.9. Detailed regulations governing the FMCS are found at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1403 (1984).
38. See generally Susskind, supra note 29, at 4-5.
39. For an operational definition of environmental mediation as contrasted with
labor mediation, see Cormick & Patton, Environmental Mediation: Defning the
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environmental mediation has been spurred by a perceived need for
alternatives to litigation4° in the environmental area and by the suc-
cess of preliminary mediation efforts. The process of environmental
mediation now has a small but established group of regular practi-
tioners and promoters,41 a growing body of environmental media-
tion theory and experience,42 and at least the beginnings of a trend
toward institutional recognition and governance.
43
Mediation has been employed successfully in a wide range of
environmental disputes, encompassing three general categories.44
The first category seeks consensus on broad policy issues. 45 The sec-
ond addresses mixed policy and site-specific issues; Alaska's coastal
zone mediation provision has been cited as an example of this type
of environmental mediation.46 Finally, and most commonly, envi-
ronmental mediation has been used to resolve site-specific disputes,
typically between proponents of facilities such as mines, dams, or
coal-powered electric utilities and local residents and environmental
interest groups.47
Process Through Experience, in ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR
CONSENSUS, supra note 8, at 76-79.
40. Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 314.
By limiting the access of interested parties, restricting the information
available for consideration, restricting the range of concerns to legally rec-
ognizable causes of action, and "segmenting" complex and interrelated
roblems into discrete legal actions, the courts make it practically impossi-
ble to reach a judgment that acknowledges the real concerns of all inter-
ested parties.
Id at 320; see also Watson & Danielson, Environmental Mediation, 15 NAT. RES.
LAW. 687, 689-90 (1983) (The typical focus of environmental litigation on proce-
dural shortcomings, such as the failure to prepare environmental impact statements
and secure necessary permits, is not well-suited to resolution of real issues "on the
ground.").
41. For a list of environmental mediation practicioners see RESOLVE CENTER
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT RESO-
LUTION ORGANIZATIONS, PRACTITIONERS AND RESEARCHERS 1-15 (1980), ex-
cerpted in OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. EPA SW-
944, USING MEDIATION WHEN SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILI-
TIES 35-43 app. B (1982) [hereinafter cited as USING MEDIATION]. For a general
listing of organizations involved in various forms of dispute resolutions see NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESOURCE
DIRECTORY (1984).
42. See, e.g., literature cited in Susskind, supra note 29, at 4 nn.3-6.
43. See supra note 8.
44. Watson & Danielson, supra note 40, at 690, 691.
45. Id at 690.
46. Id at 690 & n.7. It is the position of this note, however, that Alaska's pro-
gram can more accurately be characterized as a hybrid which partakes of key ele-
ments of the labor, environmental, and regulatory negotiation models. See infra
discussion at Section III(E).
47. Watson & Danielson, supra note 40, at 690-91.
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Environmental mediation specialists have emphasized a
number of characteristics which are typical of environmental con-
flicts and which distinguish mediation of environmental disputes
from the typical labor mediation. From this perspective, environ-
mental disputes address fundamental questions of resource alloca-
tion and protection and hence are essentially political in character.48
Unlike many other types of disputes, the effects of environmental
dispute resolution are often irreversible; they are not amenable to
renegotiation or reformulation over time.49 In contrast to labor me-
diation, the parties, issues, and costs in dispute typically are indeter-
minate50 and hotly disputed. To the extent that the interested parties
can even be identified, they comprise a complex mixture of public
and private, resident and nonresident interests, whose expertise and
resources vary widely.5 1 The ongoing, interdependent relationships
typical in labor relations are rare. Furthermore, costs and benefits
are not only extremely difficult to assess, but typically are asymmet-
rical, in that costs and risks are borne by a relatively small segment
of the population while benefits are realized much more diffusely.5 2
A final distinguishing aspect of environmental conflicts is the crucial
role played by scientific and technical information and issues in this
area.53 Although environmental disputes frequently turn on such
considerations, scientific "answers" concerning future risks and im-
pacts can seldom be found. At the same time, the proliferation of
scientific and technical information tends to cloak the underlying
value and policy conflicts. 54 In addition, scientific determinations
48. See Cormick & Patton, supra note 39, at 77; Sf Harter, The PoliticalLegiti-
macy and Judicial Review of Consensual Rules, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 471, 475 (1983).
Environmental issues are frequently described as "polycentric," a term devel-
oped by Lon Fuller.
As described by Fuller, the polycentric issue is characterized by a large
number of possible results and by the fact that many interests or groups
will be affected by any solution adopted; thus each potential solution will
have complex and unique ramifications. In graphic terms, the polycentric
controversy can be visualized as a spider web, since "[a] pull on one strand
will distribute tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a
whole."
Boyer, Alternatives to Administrative Trial-Type Hearingsfor Resolving Complex Sci-
entif, Economic, and Social Issues, 71 MICH. L. REV. 111, 116-18 (1972).
49. See Lake, Environmental Conflict and Decisionmaking, in ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 8, at 1, 6; Susskind & Wein-
stein, supra note 34, at 324.
50. Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 324.
5 1. See Lake, supra note 49, at 6.
52. See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 328-29.
53. See Lake, Characterizing Environmental Mediation, in ENVIRONMENTAL
MEDIATION: THE SEARCH FOR CONSENSUS, supra note 8, at 69.
54. See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 318-19.
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may be influenced by differences in the level of resources available
to proponents of competing positions. 5
The dispute characteristics outlined above have special implica-
tions for the dynamics of environmental mediation and distinguish it
in important ways from labor mediation. First, the question whether
mediation is an available or advisable option becomes immensely
more complicated. Because mediation is still a little-known option
for environmental dispute resolution, its use may depend on active
promotion by a would-be mediator.5 6 Second, unlike labor
mediators, environmental mediators must often begin by identifying
the key interests and securing their participation in the negotiations.
This process is perhaps the most crucial factor affecting the success
of environmental mediation,57 because it is axiomatic that media-
tion cannot succeed unless participation is voluntary, all parties have
something to gain from participating in the negotiations, and no
party with power to prevent implementation of an agreement is left
out of the proceedings.58 In environmental conflicts, affected inter-
ests are indeterminate and power relationships are complex. Conse-
quently, the threshold tasks of determining who the parties should
be and gaining their agreement to join the negotiations are key con-
cerns in environmental mediation. The potentially large number of
parties creates an additional problem typically not faced by labor
mediators: the question of what should constitute an "agreement"
when unanimity among the parties appears to be a practical impossi-
bility but a consensus of the crucial interests must be obtained.59 Fi-
nally, the link between individual negotiators and the interests they
represent is often much more tenuous in environmental than in labor
mediation, creating uncertainty about whether all necessary interests
will be adequately represented in the negotiations and will ratify and
accept the mediated agreement.60 Thus, there is an additional bur-
den on the mediator and the parties to maintain communications
55. Lake, supra note 49, at 6.
56. Many instances of environmental mediation have been initiated by the me-
diator's offer of services. Susskind, supra note 29, at 3 n.6. This contrasts with labor
mediation practice, in which FMCS mediators are expressly barred from initiating
contact with disputants absent "exceptional circumstances." Code of Professional
Conduct for Labor Mediators, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1400.735 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 337-38.
58. See Harter, supra note 30, at 42-43.
59. Id at 92-97 (discussing the complexities of determining consensus among
multiple parties).
60. See Lake, supra note 53, at 67-69; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at
338-39.
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and cultivate the commitment of key decisionmakers among the rep-
resented constituencies throughout the negotiations.6'
As suggested above, the nature of the issues themselves creates
further important differences between labor and environmental
mediation. The parties in environmental disputes may face greater
difficulty in narrowing the agenda for discussion. 62 Issues tied to
values the parties are unable or unwilling to compromise may have
to be excluded from the discussions altogether and may even make
some parties unwilling to negotiate at all. 63 In contrast to labor ne-
gotiations, the point at which issues in an environmental dispute
have become sufficiently "ripe" for mediation may be difficult to
identify.64 Perhaps most importantly, the highly technical and inde-
terminate nature of the scientific questions involved makes the quan-
tification and evaluation of gains and concessions in mutually
acceptable terms extremely difficult.65 Because technical and scien-
tific information is so crucial to environmental decisions and yet re-
mains so incomplete, indeterminate, and subject to fierce partisan
dispute, the parties' first task may be to negotiate a consensual set of
facts to be used as input to further substantive discussions. Such a
"data mediation" process may require the aid of experts in order to
identify data needs, to determine which data are unreliable, and to
identify and narrow disputed areas as far as possible while clearly
labelling remaining areas of disagreement as beyond the scope of the
negotiations.66
A final important point of contrast between environmental me-
diation and labor mediation is in the degree of institutional recogni-
tion accorded to each of them. As noted earlier, few states provide
for mediation of environmental disputes.67 Similarly, no institu-
tional body currently accredits or polices the practices of environ-
mental mediators. The development of a special code of ethics for
environmental mediators has been suggested as a possible undertak-
ing,68 but no such code is currently in effect. To some extent, envi-
ronmental mediation is likely to continue developing on an ad hoc
basis, so the need for future development of rigid institutional struc-
61. Harter, supra note 30, at 92; Stulberg, supra note 30, at 116; USING MEDIA-
TION, supra note 41, at 13.
62. See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 339-40.
63. Harter, supra note 30, at 49 ("Competing interests cannot negotiate an
agreement if the disputed issue concerns fundamental values."); Watson & Daniel-
son, supra note 40, at 696 (Other considerations aside, parties may refuse to negoti-
ate in order to avoid conferring legitimacy on the adversary and its goals or needs.).
64. See Harter, supra note 30, at 47.
65. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
66. Harter, supra note 30, at 91.
67. See supra note 8.
68. McCrory, Environmental Mediation-Another Piece for the Puzzle, 6 VT. L.
REv. 49, 65 n.58 (1981); Susskind, supra note 29, at 42.
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tures for providing and regulating mediators may be limited.6 9 In
fact, the very flexibility that makes mediation an attractive alterna-
tive would appear to militate against the specification of detailed
rules for its use.
D. Regulatory Negotiation
A final mediation model relevant to Alaska's coastal zone medi-
ation process involves direct negotiation (with or without a media-
tor) among interested parties to determine the structure and content
of administrative regulations. 70
Although informal negotiation and communication among in-
terested parties and regulatory officials are important elements in the
early stages of the regulatory development process, opportunities for
direct and interactive participation in decisions about the content of
regulations are limited.71 Moreover, under current law, actual nego-
tiation of regulations faces several potential procedural barriers.72
The Administrative Council of the United States (ACUS) has
adopted a resolution recommending that Congress enact legislation
expressly authorizing such negotiations and removing legal and pro-
cedural barriers to its use.73 This recommendation has not yet been
implemented. Indeed, at present, Alaska's coastal zone mediation
process appears to be the only state regulation which expressly inte-
grates a mediation process into its rulemaking procedures.74
Proponents of regulatory negotiation argue that the process will
mitigate several serious drawbacks of standard regulatory rulemak-
69. See generally Susskind, supra note 29, at 45.
70. See generally Boyer, supra note 48; Harter, supra note 30; Harter, supra note
48; Schuck, Litigation Bargaining & Regulation, REG., July-Aug. 1979, at 26; Stew-
art, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69
CALiF. L. REv. 1256 (1981); Note, Rethinking Regulation Negotiation as an Alterna-
five to Traditional Rulemaking, 94 HARV. L. Rav. 1871 (1981). The problems and
procedures involved would vary depending on whether the agency with responsibil-
ity for developing the regulations participated in the negotiation and adopted the
result as its proposed regulation, or whether the interested private parties reached a
separate agreement presented to the agency as part of the public participation pro-
cess during the rulemaking. This issue is moot for the statute considered here, since
state agency participation is mandated by the statute. For a general discussion of
the pros and cons of agency participation, see Harter, supra note 30, at 57-66.
71. Harter, supra note 30, at 7, 32.
72. See generally id. at 107-08; Note, supra note 70, at 1880-90. Specific potential
obstacles are discussed infra at section IV.
73. Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations, Recommendation No.
82-84, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,708, at 30,709 (1982) (adopted June 10, 1982), reprinted in
Harter, supra note 48, at 491-93 [hereinafter cited as Procedures].
74. However, Alaska's coastal zone mediation is significantly restricted in scope
compared to the ACUS procedure, since only the Council and district are partici-
pants. See infra discussion at Section IV(B)(1).
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ing procedures, which are criticized as being slow, cumbersome, ex-
cessively adversarial, and lacking in legitimacy because of ineffective
public participation mechanisms and excessive agency discretion
over essentially political choices.75 Since often the only option avail-
able to parties trying to advance their interests is a judicial challenge
of the regulations, direct negotiation also represents an alternative to
the costs and limitations of litigation.76 Proponents also argue that
regulatory negotiation allows parties to participate directly and im-
mediately in decisions affecting their interests. Moreover, these pro-
ponents point out that negotiation participants tend to wield more
direct authority than intermediaries such as lobbyists or litigation
counsel.77
Proposals for the use of mediation in regulatory negotiations
draw heavily on the theory and experience of environmental media-
tion. The two applications are similar since they deal with issues
which are frequently polycentric, value-centered, and which require
determination of complex factual issues. The problem of multiple
parties and diffuse interests, typical of environmental conflicts, is
also characteristic of regulatory disputes. Consequently, the princi-
ples of environmental negotiation generally apply in the regulatory
context as well.78 However, regulatory negotiation raises a number
of special issues. On a pragmatic level, attempting to integrate for-
mal negotiations with the already complex requirements of existing
rulemaking procedures is likely to raise many procedural issues and
potential conflicts. Further, there appears to be an underlying policy
tension between the need for flexibility and confidentiality that is
fundamental to negotiation, and the commitment to open and im-
partial agency decisionmaking that is central to administrative pro-
cedure requirements. 79 The literature of regulatory negotiation
suggests that the process offers a promising alternative to standard
rulemaking procedures in some, but by no means all, circumstances,
but stresses that such a process will require considerably more devel-
opment and experimentation before its potential scope and feasibil-
ity can be determined. 80 Nevertheless, regulatory negotiation
provides a valuable perspective for analyzing Alaska's mediation
regulations. 81
75. See Harter, supra note 30, at 22-24; Note, supra note 70, at 1871.
76. Schuck, supra note 70, at 30.
77. Harter, supra note 30, at 29-31.
78. Id at 41-42.
79. Schuck, supra note 70, at 31.
80. Harter, supra note 30, at 112-13. See generally sources cited supra note 70.
81. See specific points discussed infra at Section IV.
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E. Coastal Zone Management Mediation in Alaska - Mixing
the Models
Examining the provisions of Alaska's coastal zone management
mediation regulation in light of the three applications discussed
above suggests that Alaska's system is a hybrid which shares impor-
tant characteristics of each but which cannot be classified neatly
within any one application. In order to evaluate Alaska's mediation
system, it is important to identify how it resembles or differs from
each of the three other models, because appropriate mediation prac-
tice and procedure will vary with the fundamental assumptions un-
derlying each application.
Alaska's regulation draws on the established procedures of la-
bor mediation in several important ways. The resemblance to labor
mediation is most obvious in the regulation's express provision for
the mediation and in its reliance on the services and standards of the
primarily labor-oriented FMCS. By limiting parties to the Council
and the district, the regulation also fosters mediation dynamics
which strongly resemble those found in labor negotiations. Thus, as
in labor mediation, the parties to coastal zone management media-
tion will share an ongoing relationship based upon their common
responsibility for implementing the coastal management program.
The substantive standards of the state and federal coastal zone pro-
grams also provide the parties with a mutually binding external body
of standards and precedent to guide the deliberations. Since media-
tion does not begin until the Council has refused to approve specific
district program provisions, the regulation ensures that the issues to
be mediated will be relatively well-defined and ripe for resolution at
the time of the negotiations. These factors appear to eliminate at the
outset many of the indeterminacies and complications inherent in
the environmental and regulatory mediation models.
Despite these similarities to the relatively clearcut model of la-
bor mediation, other fundamental characteristics of Alaska's regula-
tion are more analogous to environmental or regulatory mediation
values and procedures. First, the substantive issues underlying
coastal zone regulation disputes are likely to involve environmental
questions and reflect the kinds of multivalent problems that environ-
mental mediation efforts have been designed to address. Second,
even, though the regulation limits the parties to the Council and the
district, the questions at issue will almost always touch the interests
of many other parties, whose exclusion from the negotiations might
place the legitimacy or stability of the resulting agreements in doubt.
Therefore, in some ways, environmental mediation is a better model
than labor mediation, because the parties involved in coastal zone
management mediation frequently will have to accommodate
[Vol. 1:349
1984] COASTAL ZONE PLANNING DISPUTES 363
outside interests and political pressures not typically faced by labor
mediators. Finally, the fact that the mediation arises in the context
of an administrative procedure raises many of the same issues found
in regulatory mediation. For example, interweaving the mediation
requirements with the public participation process mandated by the
APA allows the indirect inclusion of the other interested parties but
creates new complications, which are discussed further below.
In summary, regardless of its substantive context or content,
each of the mediation applications shares common elements inherent
in the mediation process itself. Furthermore, each of the three basic
models - labor, environmental, and regulatory mediation - has
some special relevance to Alaska's coastal zone management media-
tion process. Thus, Alaska's system should be analyzed within the
framework of all three models, rather than any one model.8 2 Fur-
ther, an analysis of the Alaska statute itself provides a potentially
interesting and valuable illustration of the ways in which the various
models interact. The remainder of this note examines the coastal
zone mediation provisions by considering both their relation to pre-
vious mediation applications and their potential success in promot-
ing efficient and stable resolution of coastal zone planning disputes.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC MEDIATION PROVISIONS
A. Initiation of Mediation
As noted earlier, mediation is triggered automatically whenever
the Council rejects all or part of a program submitted for approval
by a local coastal resource district;83 there is no initial consideration
whether mediation is feasible or desirable in individual cases. This
82. The hybrid quality of Alaska's approach may represent a highly realistic
response to the subject matter at issue, and hence may offer valuable procedural
flexibility over any single approach taken alone. For example, Boyer states:
[P]olycentric controversies exhibit a blend of technical, factual, and polit-
ical attributes that often seem nearly impossible to separate or accommo-
date within a single procedural framework. . . . [In the absence of more
explicit legislative guidance on such issues,] the next best approach may be
for. .. agencies to use mixed procedural forms that encompass both con-
sensual and nonconsensual devices. . . . Even when trial-type hearings
are [ultimately] required, it may be possible to approximate [the desirable
procedural flexibility] by using the pretrial phases to provide appropriate
*. . consensual techniques ....
Boyer, supra note 48, at 169.
83. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a) (Apr. 1984). The mandatory char-
acter of CZM dispute mediation contrasts with the voluntary system recommended
by Alaska's Civil Litigation Task Force. In that context, where the potential volume
of disputes is much greater than in coastal management, the Task Force commented
that although "the concept of mandatory mediation [is] highly desirable. . . suffi-
cient resources do not currently exist on which to frame a mandatory mediation
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contrasts markedly with the practice in other areas. In labor media-
tion, for example, although parties to a labor contract dispute are
required by law to notify the FMCS of upcoming negotiations, only
a small number of the disputes for which such notification is re-
ceived are actually mediated.84 Many labor contract disputes can be
resolved by direct negotiation without the assistance of a mediator,
and others to which a mediator officially is assigned may require
very little active assistance.85 In environmental mediation, the ques-
tion whether mediation is appropriate, and whether interested par-
ties are willing to participate, is a major threshold issue.
Two questions must be considered in order to assess the
mandatory aspect of Alaska's system. First, are foreseeable conflicts
between the Council and local districts concerning regulation of
coastal zone activities generally amenable to negotiation? Second, is
it reasonable to subject all such conflicts to mediation?
1. When is Mediation Appropriate? Because coastal zone
planning presents a classic problem in environmental management
- the optimum allocation, development, and protection of coastal
resources - it is appropriate to consider environmental mediation
practice and experience as a means of resolving coastal planning dis-
putes between the Council and coastal management districts.8 6 The
potential value of mediation in resolving coastal zone planning
problems has been specifically recognized by the state of New Jersey,
which has experimented with mediation as a means of reaching con-
sensus concerning data collection and evaluation needs in develop-
ing coastal management plans.87 Even if mediation offers a helpful
approach to the substantive issues in dispute, it remains necessary to
consider whether the dynamics of the Council-district relationship
and the procedures specified by the regulation are also likely to be
conducive to successful mediation.
A number of criteria for judging the appropriateness of media-
tion in particular situations have been advanced in the mediation
structure." Alaska Civil Litigation Task Force, Proposed Civil Rule 90.2, comment
a, reprinted in L. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 13.
84. Simkin, supra note 35, at 6.
85. Id
86. See, e.g. Stockholm, Environmental Mediation: An Alternative to the Court-
room, 15 STAN. LAW. 1, 21 (1979):
It seems that mediation will be most useful ... to resolve issues where
there is considerable administrative discretion and room for accommoda-
tion. Land use disputes over location of industry, landfill sites, and wilder-
ness areas may be prime candidates .... Siting of facilities like dams,
highways, and power lines may be other examples of mediable
controversies.
87. See Straus, supra note 8.
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literature. 88 While the degree of elaboration varies, each formula-
tion reflects core concerns about the voluntariness of participation,
the parties' willingness to compromise in order to reach an agree-
ment, and the mediator's neutrality.
The criteria developed by Philip J. Harter as a consultant to the
ACUS89 offer a useful standpoint from which to assess the appropri-
ateness of coastal zone mediation in Alaska. Several of the criteria
are clearly satisfied on the face of Alaska's regulation: the number of
parties is limited, the issues are ripe,90 and both parties are aware
that some resolution of the conflict is imminent 9 ' (given the default
provision for an adjudicatory hearing). The regulation also provides
some assurance that any agreement the parties reach will in fact be
implemented, by directing that a successfully mediated and ratified
agreement will constitute a final settlement of the issues.92
A second cluster of criteria focuses on the power dynamics be-
tween the parties. First, both the Council and the district must ex-
pect to benefit from the mediation and see the negotiations as the
best overall method of achieving their respective goals.93 Although
this assessment is likely to vary in individual cases, it appears that,
other considerations aside, mediation will offer more benefits to both
parties than will the alternative of an adjudicatory hearing. Because
the Council remains the ultimate authority in a hearing decision, the
district may well feel that its best advantage lies in negotiation. Sim-
ilarly, the Council will likely wish to avoid the delay and expense of
a hearing, and feel that it will have more discretion in negotiation
than it would in an adjudicatory hearing. A second power-related
criterion requires that each party feel the other has enough counter-
vailing power to place the outcome of an alternative resolution pro-
cess in doubt.94 Here again, cases may vary; however, the very fact
that a dispute has survived all the earlier stages of program develop-
ment (in which there is typically considerable informal communica-
tion between the district and the OCM) suggests that there must be
significant power on both sides.
88. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 30, at 42-52; USING MEDIATION, supra note 41,
at 13-14.
89. Harter, supra note 30, at 43-53.
90. Id at 46-47.
91. Id at48.
92. Id at 51. The potential stability of the mediated agreement is discussed
further infra at Section IV(F)(2).
93. Harter, supra note 30, at 43.
94. Id at 46. See infra Section IV(E)(2) (implications of Council's role as ulti-
mate adjudicator on power dynamics between the parties); cf Harter, supra note 30,
at 58-59 (general factors counterbalancing apparent power advantage of agency in
regulatory negotiation).
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The other criteria specified by Harter appear to be more depen-
dent on the nature of the particular disputes. In order to be an ap-
propriate subject for mediation, the dispute must not involve
fundamental values that either party is unwilling to compromise. 95
The parties must see some opportunity for gain in a substantive set-
tlement.96 Enough options and issues must be present so that each
party can find something to support and to trade off.97 Either there
must be no need for fundamental research or the parties must be
able to agree on what is needed and be willing to accept the research
results.98 Whether particular coastal planning disputes will meet
these criteria cannot be predicted in advance; thus it is impossible to
predict whether mediation will be appropriate in all cases.
Importantly, Harter and other mediation authorities stress that
it is unlikely all, or even most, of these "ideal" conditions will be met
in any mediation situation, and that such conditions are not neces-
sary for mediation to be considered appropriate and worthwhile. 99
Application of these criteria to foreseeable coastal zone planning dis-
putes in Alaska suggests that mediation may be a reasonable dispute
resolution mechanism for some disputes. Nevertheless, the question
remains whether it is reasonable to require mediation even when, for
various reasons, mediation clearly seems unsuitable. The following
discussion considers this issue.
2. Should Mediation Be Mandatory? The foregoing analysis
strongly suggests that some coastal zone planning disputes may be
unsuitable for mediation, and others conceivably could be resolved
by direct negotiation without a mediator's assistance. Nevertheless,
the mediation requirements provide screening and diversion func-
tions which suggest that the mandatory nature of the process will not
be unduly burdensome. First, given the elaborate procedural and
public participation requirements preceding the district's submission
of its program, and the likelihood that informal negotiations already
will have occurred during earlier stages, any disputes remaining at
the point of the Council's decision on the program are likely to be
serious ones that may benefit from a mediator's assistance. Indeed,
the prospect of mandatory mediation may itself provide additional
motivation to the parties to resolve their differences informally. A
second and more compelling point is that disputes clearly unsuitable
for mediation can be removed from the process relatively quickly
95. Harter, supra note 30, at 49; Harter, supra note 48, at 479 (discussing
problems of value conflicts in regulatory setting).
96. Harter, supra note 30, at 48.
97. Id at 50.
98. Id
99. See id at 44 & n.249.
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and returned to the standard adjudication process through the medi-
ator's certification that an impasse has been reached. 10°
The practical effectiveness of the impasse provision as a means
of diverting disputes which are not appropriate for mediation may
depend largely upon the time and effort necessary to secure a media-
tor and to reach a determination that an impasse exists. A mediator
sensitive to the needs and limitations of the process may be able to
screen out disputes which are obviously inappropriate for mediation
on the basis of an initial consultation with the parties, at minimal
cost in time and expense. The state might expedite this process, and
the mediation generally, by adopting several additional measures.
First, it could make an effort to familiarize potential disputants with
the mediation process before district submissions undergo Council
review. This would facilitate actual mediations and reduce the pos-
sibility that disputants might adopt an intransigent attitude out of
reluctance to engage in an additional and unfamiliar procedure.
Second, the state might institute a mechanism analogous to the noti-
fication filing required in labor disputes to alert potential mediators
of pending disputes which may require intervention. This would en-
able the mediator to contact the parties, familiarize himself with the
facts, and prepare for the mediation at the earliest possible point.
In summary, the mandatory character of the mediation provi-
sion is likely to introduce some inefficiency into the process, because
in very "easy" or very "hard" disputes the parties must go through at
least the initial stages of the mediation process even though media-
tion ultimately will be unnecessary or impossible. This potential
"overkill," however, is counterbalanced by the advantage of promot-
ing the use of mediation in appropriate cases. This advantage, to-
gether with the potential for screening and diversion of
inappropriate cases, supports a conclusion that mandatory mediation
should not be unduly burdensome.
B. Identification of Parties and Representatives
1. Parties. The mediation regulation expressly limits the par-
ties to the mediation to the Council and the district. This limitation
offers several advantages. First, the limitation avoids the complex
issues which would be raised by the need to identify the additional
interests which should be represented in a comprehensive negotiat-
ing group. Identification of appropriate parties has presented a ma-
jor challenge for environmental mediators to date.' 0 ' Identifying
100. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(3)-(4) (Apr. 1984).
101. See supra notes 29-30, 57-59 and accompanying text.
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and including outside parties also would require additional, com-
plex, and time-consuming procedures, such as those proposed by the
ACUS. I0 2 Second, environmental and regulatory mediation experts
have stressed the importance of limiting the negotiating group to a
manageable size - for example, where necessary, determining the
minimum number of groups or individuals sufficient to represent ad-
equately a given set of "interests."'' 0 3 Alaska's two-party limitation
clearly avoids this complication.
Although this dyadic structure parallels the established struc-
ture of labor mediation, from the viewpoint of either environmental
or regulatory mediation it represents a substantial limitation which
may undercut the effectiveness of mediation by failing to capitalize
on its potential to secure the direct participation and agreement of
multiple parties in complex disputes. Thus, the limitation of parties
will deprive other interested parties of the opportunity to affect di-
retly regulations which will impinge on their interests. As a result,
the agreement reached may be less effective and more vulnerable to
outside attack than one reached by a consensus of all interests. 104
The limitation of parties may be justified, both theoretically and
pragmatically, by the extensive rulemaking and public commentary
procedures which precede the mediation and the opportunity pro-
vided for public review and comment on the final outcome.'05 The
resulting record is likely to direct the attention of the negotiating
parties to the needs of the absent interests, both by providing a
source of factual information and by reminding the parties of their
social and political constituencies. Nevertheless, a record developed
by the traditional public participation process will still be essentially
adversarial rather than consensual. The parties will tend to advocate
inflexible positions, overstate points, and understate nuances.10 6 The
Council could mitigate these problems, at least partially, by rou-
tinely exercising its discretionary authority to call public meetings
before holding mediation sessions. 0 7 The public notice of the hear-
ings would help to identify the issues to be resolved and to empha-
size the nature of the mediation process and the need for
nonadversarial statements of priorities and concerns. 08 Under the
102. See Procedures, supra note 73, at 494-96; Harter, supra note 30, at 67-98.
103. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 30, at 46; USING MEDIATION, supra note 41, at
16.
104. See generally Boyer, supra note 48, at 168 ("[Wihere the agency bargains as
a surrogate for affected segments of the public it may prove an ineffective bargainer,
or may be perceived by the public as ineffectual, thereby weakening either the accu-
racy or the acceptability of the decision.").
105. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.150(g) (Apr. 1984).
106. See generally Harter, supra note 30, at 19-22.
107. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a) (Apr. 1984).
108. Cf. Harter, supra note 30, at 79, 117 (Federal Register notice of proposed
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Alaska regulation, the record of any hearing is given to the media-
tor,10 9 who can use it as a guide in his interactions with the parties
and possibly as a means of reminding the parties of their responsibil-
ity to consider the fairness and advisability of any contemplated
agreements in light of absent interests.
Despite the potential advantages achieved by structuring the
mediation for only two parties, with public review and participation
at earlier and later points, mediation theory and experience suggest
that the exclusion of other parties from the negotiations may be fatal
to the effectiveness of the process in some cases. As discussed earlier,
mediation cannot be expected to produce a stable and effective
agreement when any interested party with the power to block imple-
mentation of the agreement perceives itself to be unrepresented. 10
Potential power to block implementation of an agreement is pro-
vided by the procedures of the CZM program and the APA to any
interested party with the motivation and resources to oppose ratifica-
tion of the mediated provisions.'' It certainly is conceivable that
such a situation might arise in the coastal planning context, given the
potentially volatile nature of the issues and the commitment and re-
sources of concerned interests. Thus, in some cases, mediation ef-
forts involving only the Council and district, however effective
between those parties, may be rendered pointless by continued oppo-
sition from other interests; whereas including other interested parties
in the negotiations might result in a mutually agreeable and ulti-
mately more efficient outcome.
2. Representatives. An important characteristic of mediation
is that although interested parties participate directly in the negotia-
tions, the actual individuals engaged in the negotiations are not prin-
cipals but rather are agents of their respective interests.1 2 Thus, the
various negotiating individuals must remain aware that they cannot
unilaterally bind their constituencies, but instead must educate and
persuade them to accept the mediated outcome." 3
Alaska's mediation statute and regulations are silent on the se-
lection and qualifications of mediation participants. The mediation
literature suggests that the representatives should have sufficient
authority and/or access to key decisionmakers to ensure that the
regulatory negotiation is designed to maximize consensual participation by affected
interests and thus minimize subsequent legal challenges by absent parties.).
109. ALASKA ADMiN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a) (Apr. 1984).
110. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
111. Potential avenues of attack by such parties are discussed infra at text accom-
panying notes 186-201.
112. Fuller, supra note 23, at 311.
113. See Lake, supra note 53, at 67-69; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at
337-38.
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agreement reached will be accepted and implemented by them." 4
Participants also should have ready access to administrative support
resources, staff, and expertise which may be helpful in negotia-
tions." 5 In Alaska, both requirements are likely to be satisfied be-
cause the negotiators will be fairly high-level staff members or
officials of the Council or district having access to significant organi-
zation resources. 116 Further, by limiting participation in the media-
tion to the two government bodies, Alaska has avoided a difficult
issue typically faced in environmental and regulatory mediation: en-
suring that the individuals present are actually representatives of the
complex and diffuse "public interests" for whom they claim to
speak.117 Thus, except for the limitation of parties discussed above,
Alaska's mediation process does not appear to raise significant issues
concerning the participants in mediation. Should the process ever be
expanded to include other interests, however, this issue would gain
considerable importance.
C. Selection and Qualifications of Mediators
1. Requirements of the Regulation. Under the regulation, the
parties may mutually agree on a mediator, or they may request that
the FMCS appoint one. If the parties cannot agree within ten days
of the Council decision that triggers the mediation requirement, they
must request an FMCS nominee. If either party disagrees with the
FMCS nomination, the FMCS is to submit the names of three quali-
fied mediators, and the mediator will be the nominee remaining after
each party has eliminated one name."18
Beyond the use of the term "qualified mediators"' '19 in describ-
ing FMCS nominees, the regulation is silent on the issue of mediator
qualifications or characteristics. At present, parties may be forced to
114. See Harter, supra note 30, at 54-55 & nn.302-03.
115. Procedures, supra note 73, at 495 (agency should provide financial or other
support necessary to foster broadly-based, successful negotiations); Susskind &
Weinstein, supra note 34, at 352 (regulatory agency as important potential source of
technical and scientific support).
116. This conclusion assumes that both Council and district budgets will receive
sufficient funding to maintain the necessary level of staff support for program devel-
opment activities, including mediation. If coastal planning funds are significantly
reduced in the future, the quality of negotiations under the mediation provision
might suffer as a result. Cf. Jones, Major Issues in Developing Alaska's Outer Conti-
nental Shelf Oil and Gas Resources, 1 ALASKA L. REV. 209, 258-62 (1984) (discussing
potential adverse effects of funding cuts on ability of Alaska state and local govern-
ments to manage coastal programs).
117. See Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 333.
118. See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(1) (Apr. 1984).
119. Id § 85.170(a)(1).
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choose either an experienced labor mediator, with little or no sub-
stantive background in coastal zone management or regulatory dis-
putes, or accept the services of a mediator whose qualifications and
experience must be judged without the assistance of established ac-
crediting mechanisms. 120 A number of general characteristics and
skills that would be desirable in an ideal mediator have been de-
scribed in the mediation literature and should provide some assist-
ance in selecting and evaluating mediators. 121 Because mediation is
so process-oriented and dispute-specific, spelling out such require-
ments by statute or regulation is neither necessary nor desirable. 122
Rather, the parties should retain the flexibility to choose someone
with whom they feel comfortable.123 Nevertheless, the importance of
mediator selection cannot be overemphasized, since the extent to
which the mediator's skills and personality complement those of the
negotiating parties will be crucial to the success of the mediation.
2. Appropriateness of Labor Mediation Credentials and Experi-
ence as Qualifications for Mediating Coastal Zone Regulation Dis-
putes. The Alaska regulation implicitly recognizes that labor
mediators are qualified to perform coastal zone management media-
tion by allowing parties to select mediators through the FMCS and
by stating that mediators in coastal zone management disputes will
be bound by the Code of Ethics for Labor Mediators. 2 4 The FMCS
provides an existing pool of seasoned mediators who are readily
available for service. Since many of the functions of a mediator re-
main substantially constant across different substantive areas, it is
likely that a qualified labor mediator will possess the basic process
skills required by the parties. Nevertheless, several important dis-
tinctions should be borne in mind in selecting a mediator from this
group.
First, labor mediators may be expected to lack substantive fa-
miliarity with coastal zone management issues. Substantive exper-
tise plays an important role in effectively resolving disputes.
Environmental and regulatory mediators and theorists have attached
varying degrees of importance to this factor. Most agree that the
mediator must at least be capable of becoming educated in the basic
120. Where no mediators experienced in the particular substantive area of an
environmental dispute are available because no such dispute has been mediated,
disputants are advised to "look for the most nearly similar experience" in terms of
comparable issue complexity and party dynamics. USING MEDIATION, supra note
41, at 30.
121. See, e.g., Stulberg, supra note 30, at 94-95; USING MEDIATION, supra note
41, at 29-31.
122. McCrory, supra note 68, at 75.
123. See USING MEDIATION, supra note 41, at 29 (The most basic criterion for
mediator selection should be acceptability of the mediator to all parties.).
124. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(1) (Apr. 1984).
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technical areas at issue.125 However, the time needed for even mini-
mal education could delay the process. There also appears to be a
significant danger that a labor expert might miss chances to make
imaginative connections and suggestions about important nuances of
coastal zone management disputes. At the other end of the spec-
trum, one prominent environmental mediator cautions that a media-
tor with too much substantive expertise may tend to impose his own
interpretation of the information and issues upon the parties to the
mediation.' 26 This also creates a danger of missing important new
insights and may result in an agreement which is imposed by the
mediator rather than created by the parties.
Second, in most cases labor mediators do not have to consider
any parties or interests aside from those directly present at the nego-
tiation table. 127 This background may make them relatively inflexi-
ble in the more polycentric and politically-oriented coastal zone
regulatory disputes. This limitation may be less serious, however, in
the case of individuals with experience in negotiating public-sector
employment disputes, where external and political interests play an
extremely important role.
These potential drawbacks might be minimized in several ways.
The Council could identify or develop a pool of experienced
mediators with appropriate substantive qualifications and make their
existence known to potential disputants before mediation situations
develop. In the absence of such guidance, parties forced to select
among labor mediators might seek out those with experience in dis-
putes having dynamics at least roughly analogous to those found in
the coastal zone management setting. At least some screening and
matching of available mediators and disputes might be obtained by
providing the FMCS with information about the scope of the dispute
and the special needs of the coastal zone management process. In
addition, public hearings directed specifically toward the mediation,
as discussed earlier, would provide an important mechanism for ed-
ucating the mediator about the issues in dispute.
3. Selection and Evaluation of Non-FMCS Mediators. At
present, non-FMCS mediators as a general class are not subject to
any officially-recognized system of training, accreditation, or disci-
pline comparable to that provided in labor mediation by the
125. Lake, Unifying the Concept of Third-Party Intervention in Environmental Dis-
putes, ENVTL. COMMENT, May 1977, at 6, 7; Stulberg, supra note 30, at 96.
126. McCrory, supra note 68, at 57 n.27 (quoting G. Cormick, Environmental
Mediation in the U.S.: Experience and Future Directions 1 (unpublished paper
presented to the American Association for Advancement of Science, 1981 Annual
Meeting, Toronto, Canada)). This view is also reflected in USING MEDIATION,
supra note 41, at 30.
127. Susskind, supra note 29, at 15.
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FMCS. 128 A growing body of organizations and individuals, how-
ever, have accumulated considerable experience in alternative dis-
pute resolution. 129 These organizations and individuals are an
important resource for parties who may be interested in the media-
tion of their disputes. The use of a mediator affiliated with one of
these groups may provide valuable assurance of a nonlabor media-
tor's experience.
4. Ethical Standards and Mediator Accountability. Alaska's
statute provides standards governing the mediator's conduct by in-
corporating the FMCS Code of Professional Conduct for Labor
Mediators (the "FMCS Code"). 130 No such code has yet been devel-
oped expressly for environmental mediation. The FMCS Code, by
its terms, is designed to apply to "all professional mediators em-
ployed by city, State or Federal agencies or. . .privately retained
by parties."'' 3 Thus, the incorporation of this provision may serve a
valuable function in Alaska by establishing a clearly-defined com-
mon standard of conduct for all mediators, whether supplied by the
FMCS or otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Such a statutory
standard may be especially important in view of the novelty of the
statute, the parties' lack of experience in evaluating the credentials
even of experienced mediators, and particularly, the potential need
for "consumer protection" if the Council and districts find them-
selves confronted with numerous offers to mediate by inexperienced
or non-accredited individuals.
The FMCS Code previously has been suggested as a starting
point for an environmental mediators' code.' 32 Indeed, the majority
of the Code's provisions are applicable to any mediation effort, since
they concern such matters as the mediator's duties of neutrality, in-
tegrity, and confidentiality. 133 Nevertheless, because the FMCS
Code is designed expressly for labor mediators, consideration of
whether it is equally well-suited to govern the conduct of coastal
zone management mediation is appropriate.
The FMCS Code contains seven explicit references to labor
128. See id at 4-5.
129. See supra note 41.
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1400 app. (1983).
131. Id at Preamble (emphasis added).
132. See McCrory, supra note 68, at 65 n.58; Susskind, supra note 29, at 42.
133. For example, the Code states:
Since mediation is essentially a voluntary process, the acceptability of the
mediator by the parties as a person of integrity, objectivity and fairness is
absolutely essential. . . .The quality of his character as well as his intel-
lectual, emotional, social and technical attributes will reveal themselves by
the conduct of the mediator and his oral and written communications with
the parties... and the public.
29 C.F.R. § 1400 app. at 46 (1983).
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mediation, collective bargaining, and other labor-oriented matters.
The majority of these may be harmonized with other uses of media-
tion without altering the substance of the Code simply by disregard-
ing the labor terminology or substituting neutral terms such as
"mediation" or "negotiation."1 34 Other portions of the Code, which
deal with relations among several mediators involved in the same
dispute and with the special responsibilities of mediators who are
government employees, may have limited relevance to any given
coastal zone dispute and simply could be disregarded when the pro-
visions are irrelevant. In two instances, however, the explicitly
labor-oriented language of the FMCS Code arguably makes it inap-
propriate for coastal zone mediation.
The first such instance deals with the mediator's obligation of
substantive expertise. The FMCS Code states that "[t]he mediator
has a continuing responsibility to study industrial relations to im-
prove his skills and upgrade his abilities."' 35 This provision is
clearly irrelevant to the practice of coastal zone management media-
tion in Alaska. More importantly, the provision reflects an essential
difference between labor mediation and other mediation applica-
tions. The FMCS Code contemplates a "typical" mediator, who can
make a full career of resolving collective bargaining disputes and
who has access to an established body of ongoing experience, prece-
dent, and specialized expertise, the mastery of which is relevant to
his effectiveness in settling that particular type of dispute. 36 By con-
trast, Alaska's mediation process and the disputes it addresses are
more likely to resemble the environmental model, in which individ-
ual disputes are relatively isolated and infrequent. Consequently,
the volume of disputes is unlikely to require a pool of full-time
mediators or lead to the development of an ongoing body of experi-
ence.137 Thus, the practical realities and underlying purpose of the
continuing study requirements for labor mediators appear to be ab-
sent in Alaska's coastal zone management.
Continuing study and education in labor relations is unneces-
sary for effective mediation of coastal zone management issues.
Consequently, a conscientious mediator who wishes to comply with
the spirit of the Code's requirements for coastal zone dispute
134. E.g., "The primary responsibility for the resolution of a labor dispute rests
upon the parties themselves."; "It is desirable that agreement be reached by collec-
tive bargaining without mediation assistance."; "Collective bargaining is, in essence, a
. . . voluntary process."; "[Ihe mediator does not regulate or control any of the
content of a collective bargaining agreement." Id at 46, 47 (emphasis added
throughout).
135. Id at 47.
136. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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mediators will be faced with some difficulty in divining the legisla-
ture's real intent with regard to this requirement. The simplest re-
sponse such an individual might make to this provision would be to
disregard it. Another possible interpretation would be to infer a sub-
stitute requirement that the mediator educate himself in coastal zone
management issues or in administrative procedure, in order to ob-
tain a level of practical expertise similar to that of the experienced
labor mediator in the collective bargaining area.' 38 As discussed
earlier, however, environmental and regulatory mediation experts
disagree about the extent to which such substantive expertise is nec-
essary or even desirable. Additionally, such an interpretation ap-
pears to run counter to the legislature's willingness to accept labor
mediators as qualified coastal zone mediators. Likewise, a require-
ment of expertise or education in coastal planning might signifi-
cantly narrow the pool of qualified mediators. On this issue, then,
the legislature's blanket adoption of the FMCS Code has created un-
necessary ambiguity as to the intended expertise requirement.
The second instance in which the FMCS Code's application to
coastal zone mediation merits further examination is in its treatment
of the mediator's responsibility to the public. The Code states em-
phatically that "[t]he primary purpose of mediation is to assist the
parties to achieve a settlement."'139 The implication is that the medi-
ator typically need not be primarily concerned with the effects of a
settlement on nonparties, as long as the settlement is agreeable to the
parties to the mediation 40 and is not "obviously contrary to public
policy.' 41 The Code recognizes a limited, labor-specific exception
when the public interest would be served by having "a particular
dispute settled;. . . a work stoppage ended; and normal operations
138. This approach would be analogous to that proposed by Alaska's Civil Liti-
gation Task Force, which would require divorce and child custody mediators to
certify (I) familiarity with Alaska court procedures and property division issues;
(2) possession of a law degree or substantively relevant graduate degree plus two
years' relevant experience and (3) at least 40 hours of mediation or conciliation
training. Alaska Civil Litigation Task Force, Proposed Civil Rule 90.2(b)(2)(A),
reprinted in L. FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 11-12.
139. 29 C.F.R. § 1400 app. at 47 (1983).
140. See Susskind, supra note 29, at 6 (The mediator is presumed to have done a
good job if the immediate parties are pleased with the outcome and the bargain
holds.).
141. 29 C.F.R. § 1400 app. at 47 (1983) (Even here the mediator has no power or
duty to prevent such an agreement, but "conceivabl[y] ... might find it necessary
to withdraw ... if it is patently clear that the parties intend to use his presence as
implied governmental sanction for [such] an agreement.").
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* . .resumed." 142 As noted earlier, the issue of public interest repre-
sentation will be both different and more complex in coastal zone
mediation than in classic labor mediation. 143
The extent to which a mediator should hold himself bound to
safeguard the interests of parties not present in the negotiations has
inspired spirited debate in the environmental mediation literature.
One commentator has suggested that the mediator should adopt an
extremely active role in order to maximize the substantive fairness of
the ultimate agreement and its soundness as a substantive precedent
in future disputes.144 Others, including some experienced labor
mediators, 45 have rejected this viewpoint as not only unrealistic
from a practical standpoint, but also unsound because it would un-
dermine the fundamental neutrality of the mediator's role. 146 As
discussed earlier, the Alaska statute's exclusion of interested parties
other than the Council and the district from participation in the ne-
gotiations may place considerable pressure on the mediator to act as
a surrogate for absent interests. The Alaska regulation raises the
possibility of enlisting the mediator to safeguard the public interest,
by directing that the record of any pre-mediation hearings be sup-
plied to the mediator. 147 No further guidance is provided, however,
with respect to how the mediator should use such a record in the
negotiations. Alaska's blanket adoption of the FMCS Code suggests
that whether or not the legislature considered this issue, it passed up
a potential opportunity to clarify the mediator's responsibility to the
public in the special setting of coastal zone management disputes.
D. Confidentiality Issues
The need to preserve the confidentiality of information revealed
to the mediator is recognized universally as an indispensible element
of successful mediation.148 This concern is reflected in the Alaska
142. Id The classic example of such a case would be a strike by public employ-
ees performing vital functions (e.g., teachers, garbage collectors).
143. See supra at notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
144. See Susskind, supra note 29, at 40-47.
145. See McCrory, supra note 68; Stulberg, supra note 30 (both written in re-
sponse to Susskind).
146. See, e.g., McCrory, supra note 68, at 59. Making the mediator responsible
for substantive fairness and wisdom of agreements (e.g. by subjecting mediators to
suit by the parties), "would ... significantly change the role and function of
mediators and thereby alter the mediation process. The effect of these changes
would stifle the use of mediation by destroying its procedural flexibility, by reducing
its acceptability to disputants, and by discouraging qualified persons from serving as
mediators." Id
147. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a) (Apr. 1984).
148. See, e.g., USING MEDIATION, supra note 41, at 31:
Handling of Confidences. The mediator's ability to assist the parties is pro-
portional to the parties' willingness to share confidences regarding their
basic concerns, possible areas of agreement, and even their willingness to
cede certain positions. The mediator should clearly be able to differentiate
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statute's express provision that "[m]ediation sessions must be con-
ducted in a manner so that the parties will have the assurance and
confidence that information disclosed to the mediator will remain
confidential."149 The more specific requirements of the FMCS Code
are incorporated into the Alaska statute by reference. The Code
specifies that "[c]onfidential information acquired by the mediator
should not be disclosed to others for any purpose, or in a legal pro-
ceeding or be used directly or indirectly for the personal benefit or
profit of the mediator."150 The Code also restricts the release of pub-
lic information, 151 and bars the mediator from disclosing confi-
dential bargaining positions, proposals, or suggestions without the
permission of the communicating party.' 52 While such provisions
may be vital to the success of mediation, the state's participation in
the process creates an unavoidable tension between the need for con-
fidentiality and the countervailing policy value of openness in gov-
ernment.' 53 Several commentators have expressed uncertainty
whether mediation proceedings may be made subject to state public
records ("freedom of information") and open meetings ("govern-
ment in the sunshine") laws, thereby discouraging participation in
the mediation.' 54
Despite these concerns, an examination of Alaska statutes gov-
erning public access to state meetings and records suggests that the
confidentiality of coastal zone mediation arguably could be shielded
from forced disclosures. Under the state's Public Meetings Act "[a]ll
meetings of. . . [any] administrative. . . council. . . or other or-
ganization, including subordinate units. . . of the state or any of its
political subdivisions . . . supported wholly or partly by public
money . . . are open to the public except as otherwise provided
by this section."' 155 Among the exceptions, however, are meetings
between information to be conveyed from one party to another with attri-
bution, information to be conveyed but only as a mediator's observation or
guess, and information that is given strictly for the mediator's own back-
ground and not to be conveyed to other parties. Violation or misunder-
standing of such confidences is grounds for dismissal of a mediator.
149. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(3) (Apr. 1984).
150. 29 C.F.R. § 1400 app. at 47 (1983).
151. "[T]he mediator may release appropriate information with due regard (1) to
the desires of the parties, (2) to whether that information will assist or impede...
settlement. . . and (3) to the needs of an informed public." 29 C.F.R. § 1400 app.
at 47 (1983).
152. Id at 47.
153. Schuck, supra note 70, at 31.
154. See Harter, supra note 30, at 83-84; Stockholm, supra note 86, at 25. The
ACUS has recommended that Congress enact legislation to provide that "informa-
tion tendered to [regulatory negotiation groups] should not be considered an agency
record under the Freedom of Information Act." Procedures, supra note 73, at 493.
155. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1980).
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concerning "matters which by law or ordinance are required to be
confidential."'' 56 Given the express provision for confidentiality in
the mediation statute, this exception could be used to justify exclu-
sion of the public from the mediation process where necessary to
promote a successful agreement. 157 Similarly, although public disclo-
sure of agency records is mandated by section 95.010(a) of the
Alaska Administrative Code, the Code exempts records from disclo-
sure where authorized by a valid state or federal "regulation, or by a
privilege, exemption or principle recognized by the courts, or by an
agency protective order authorized by law."' 158 Here again, nondis-
closure would appear to be supported by the confidentiality lan-
guage of the mediation statute. Nondisclosure of mediation records
is further supported by recognized exemptions under the federal
Freedom of Information Act' 59 and by the judicially recognized
privilege shielding labor mediators from forced testimony concern-
ing mediation proceedings. 160
Finally, claims of confidentiality may be strengthened further
by the mediation statute's provision for public information and re-
view both before and after the mediation and in the rulemaking pro-
cess as a whole. These procedures might be viewed by the courts as
serving the same function - providing public access to government
156. Id
157. Even if a court were to conclude that failure to open mediation sessions to
the public violated the Public Meetings Act, there is precedent for declining none-
theless to void the mediated agreement under the Act. In Hammond v. North Slope
Borough, 645 P.2d 750, 767 (Alaska 1982), the supreme court affirmed a lower
court's refusal to void an offshore oil leasing program which it found to be a product
of agency participation in meetings with interested parties in violation of the Public
Meetings Act. The court reasoned that voiding the action was not required because
the violation was harmless, the administrative record demonstrated substantial pub-
lic input at all stages leading up to the final decision, and the ultimate decision was
made by the agency commissioner and not by the groups participating in the closed
meetings. Id at 764-65. The same reasoning should provide persuasive support for
a similar finding in the case of a properly conducted mediation proceeding.
158. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 95.010(b) (Apr. 1984).
159. See Feerick, Labor Relations-Continued Vitality of the Privilege of Federal
Mediators, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1981, at 2 (citing Pipefitters Local Union No. 208 v.
Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, No. 79-C-1382 (D. Colo. June 26, 1980)).
160. "Courts and other adjudicative bodies have upheld the privilege because of
a public interest in maintaining the mediator's neutrality . . . . Were this not the
case, parties to labor disputes might decline to use mediation services." Id The
privilege also protects individual mediators' future impartiality from being discred-
ited. Id
The mediator's privilege has been successfully asserted by an environmental
mediator. See id at 2 & n.15.
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- as the disclosure requirements and hence as reducing the need for
direct public access to the negotiations.' 6'
E. Failure to Agree: Impasse Determination and Its
Consequences
1. Determination and Effects of an Impasse. The regulation
provides that if the mediator determines the negotiations have
reached an impasse, the mediation will be terminated and the matter
will be set for an adjudicatory hearing. 162 The question of what con-
stitutes an impasse is not addressed in the statute or the regulation.
Failure to address this question is consistent with general mediation
practice and experience, since the mediator is left free to exercise his
own judgment under the unique circumstances of each case. Once
the mediator decides that the parties are at an impasse, he has ten
days to notify the parties of his determination.163 Twenty days after
the time of the impasse determination, the Council is directed to be-
gin adjudicatory hearing proceedings. 64 The mediator is required
to declare an impasse if an agreement has not been reached within
sixty to ninety days from the commencement of the negotiations. 165
The statutory mediation deadline represents a significant depar-
ture from environmental mediation theory. Mediation experts gen-
erally agree that some time limits must be set if negotiations are to
succeed;' 66 nevertheless, they place an equal or greater emphasis on
preserving the mediator's ability to tailor the pace and conduct of the
mediation to the particular circumstances he confronts.167 From this
viewpoint, the automatic cutoff mandated by Alaska's statute may be
inadvisable as a matter of policy, because it may foreclose some
161. See Harter, supra note 30, at 85. Harter argues that closed sessions are both
necessary for successful negotiation and offset by other aspects of the process:
The procedures of the negotiation process itself provide the safeguards that
accrue from public meetings. The political legitimacy of the resulting rule
derives from [its] acceptance by the parties in interest, and not on the pub-
lic procedures by which it was developed. Further, the parties should feel
no inhibition from meeting on a confidential basis with the mediator or
other parties to the negotiation.
Id at 84 (citation omitted).
162. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(5)(c) (Apr. 1984).
163. Id § 85.170(a)(4) (Apr. 1984).
164. Id § 85.170(a)(3) (Apr. 1984). Conceivably, however, negotiations could be
reopened during the ten-day period between the mediator's notification of impasse
to the parties under subsection (a)(4) and the Council's deadline for setting an adju-
dicatory hearing date (twenty days from the declaration of impasse) under subsec-
tion (c).
165. The statutory cutoff period is sixty days; however, the mediator and both
parties may agree to a single thirty-day extension. Id
166. See, e.g., Harter, supra note 30, at 75. "[N]egotiations are likely to work best
if a decision is inevitable, or even better, imminent." Id at 47.
167. See, e.g., McCrory, supra note 68, at 56.
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potential mediation agreements in favor of a more adversarial adju-
dicatory proceeding, which may ultimately consume equal or greater
time and resources than a successful mediation would have.
The practical effect of the statutory deadline remains to be seen.
Its potential to foreclose agreements, however, may be mitigated
substantially by the fact that the mediation most likely will follow a
long process of regulatory development, including considerable com-
munication and informal negotiation. Consequently, issues should
be clear and relations among the parties well-established at the out-
set of the mediation. As a result, if an agreement can be reached at
all, it probably will be reached in a fairly short time.
2. Implications of Using the Administrative Hearing under the
APA as a Fallback to the Mediation Process. The coastal zone me-
diation statute and its accompanying regulations provide that where
mediation fails, the final content of the district program shall be de-
termined by the Council after an adjudicatory hearing to which both
the district and the interested public may be parties. Specifically,
section 46.40.060(c) of the Alaska Code states:
If, after mediation, the differences have not been resolved to the
mutual agreement of the coastal resource district and the council,
the council shall call for a public hearing and shall resolve the
differences in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act
[APA, section 44.62 of the Alaska Code]. . . . After [the] hearing,
the council shall enter [judicially enforceable] findings which may
require (1) that the district ... program be amended to make it
consistent with the provisions of this chapter of the guidelines and
standards adopted by the council; (2) that the district ... pro-
gram be revised to accommodate a use of state concern; or (3) any
other action be taken by the ... district as appropriate.1 68
Under the accompanying regulation, 69 the hearing must be set
within twenty days from the determination of an impasse. Notice
must be served on the district and on all parties who commented on
the OCM's original recommendation to the Council and the Coun-
cil's initial rejection of the district plan. Any party served with such
notice may intervene as a party to the hearing.
This provision serves as a necessary mechanism for the transi-
tion from the mediation process back to the standard rulemaking
process when mediation is unsuccessful.170 By providing a stringent
procedural backup system, the provision also insulates the state from
168. ALASKA STAT. § 46.060(c) (1982).
169. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(c) (Apr. 1984).
170. See Boyer, supra note 48, at 167. "The absence of [economic and structural
incentives to negotiate found in labor but not in regulatory negotiations] means that
an alternative, nonconsensual form of decisionmaking must be available, and the
form that this coercive process takes can have a great impact on the form and struc-
ture of the bargaining." Id (citation omitted).
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potential criticism that the mediation process is excessively informal
or experimental. Yet the fact that one party to the mediation also
will be the primary decisionmaker if the mediation is unsuccessful
may be expected to significantly influence the dynamics of the
negotiations.
An important threshold question in this regard is whether the
Council's potential role as the ultimate decisionnaker gives it too
much power in a dispute, which may cause the district to see itself as
having nothing to gain from good faith mediation. If this were the
case, the prospects for a mediated settlement would be poor and the
mediation process will simply add yet another layer to the already
cumbersome regulatory development process. 171 Several factors sug-
gest, though, that the balance of power between the parties actually
will be significantly less skewed toward the Council than the adjudi-
catory hearing fallback provision indicates. First, the achievement
of a more informal settlement and the avoidance of a full-scale ad-ministrative hearing procedure is likely to be attractive to both par-
ties. Second, although the fact that the mediation procedure has
been triggered indicates deep-seated disagreement between the two
parties, the district may still prefer a negotiated agreement to a for-
mal order emerging from an APA hearing. Thus, mediation may
offer more advantages to both parties than would an administrative
hearing provision.
Moreover, the appearance of a potential power imbalance cre-
ated by the Council's dual statutory role as a mediation participant
and as the final adjudicator may be neutralized by the establishment
of procedures rigidly separating the two functions within the Coun-
cil. Such separation is a common and necessary practice among reg-
ulatory bodies which combine investigatory and adjudicatory
functions.
A potentially more serious issue raised by the use of the adjudi-
catory hearing as a fallback procedure if mediation fails concerns its
potential influence on the parties' negotiating strategies. To the ex-
tent that the hearing procedure is perceived by one of the parties as
more advantageous than mediation, its availability as an alternative
may encourage the parties to negotiate half-heartedly or to "force"
an impasse. A party anticipating a subsequent adjudication might
be tempted to use the mediation process to gain information which
would be useful at the hearing stage or to build a record which
would be advantageous to its adversarial position. By putting the
parties on notice that the mediation record may not be used in later
judicial proceedings, the regulation's confidentiality provisions can
insulate the mediation process from such maneuvers. The dynamics
171. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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of the mediation and the effects of the hearing alternative are diffi-
cult to anticipate since they may be expected to vary in each case. 172
The problem of parties retaining litigation as a strategic option, how-
ever, is not unique to coastal zone management disputes, and an im-
portant function of the mediator is to establish and enforce standards
of good faith negotiation that will minimize such abuse.' 73 Further-
more, where good faith negotiation appears impossible, the mediator
retains the power to declare an impasse and re-route the dispute into
the traditional rulemaking procedure with minimal expenditures of
time and resources.174 In summary, although the availability of ad-
judicatory hearings may influence the mediation dynamics, the pro-
vision does not appear fatal to the potential success of the mediation
program.
A final issue not directly addressed by the statute or regulations
concerns situations in which the Council and the district are able to
negotiate and agree on some matters, despite reaching an impasse on
others. The mediation provisions do not expressly address such a sit-
uation; however, they do not expressly preclude a case in which
some matters could be settled by mediation, leaving others for the
administrative hearing process. In this situation, it would appear
inefficient to include in the hearing matters on which the Council
and the district were able to agree.
F. Agreement: Formalization and Stability of a Mediated
Settlement
1. Formalization. The statute specifies that once the parties
have reached an agreement its terms must be set out in writing. 75
Mediation authorities agree that reducing the agreement to writing is
crucial to the mediation process, and that this requirement may rep-
resent one of the most difficult stages of negotiation. 76 Harter rec-
ommends that in regulatory negotiations, the ultimate agreement
should specify the exact wording of the version agreed upon.1 77 This
level of specificity tests the parties' consensus and identifies areas
which may require additional consideration and negotiation. 178
172. See supra note 24.
173. See Harter, supra note 30, at 82-83 (mediator's role in establishing ground
rules and maintaining good faith negotiations).
174. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
175. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(5) (Apr. 1984).
176. Harter, supra note 30, at 97-98; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 345.
177. Harter, supra note 30, at 98.
178. Id Harter also contrasts the desirable written product of a regulatory nego-
tiation with the more formalistic preambles commonly provided for proposed
agency rules: "Because the legitimacy of the rule rests on the collective judgment of
the [parties,] the explanation. . . should be a discusssion of the information the
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In contrast to the rigid deadlines established for reaching an ini-
tial agreement, no specific deadlines are attached to the formaliza-
tion stage,' 79 even though extensive further discussions may be
needed to establish the precise wording of an agreement after its gen-
eral terms have been accepted by both parties. 80 The lack of a
deadline at this stage may provide an escape valve from the strict
time constraints otherwise imposed, at least where the parties and
the mediator can agree that sufficient accord has been reached in
order to frame an agreement. The mediator's power to declare an
impasse even at this late stage' 8' would limit the potential for abuse
of such a time extension by the parties.
2. Stability and Review of Mediated Agreements. Once the
Council and the district have reached an agreement, its terms consti-
tute "the final settlement of outstanding disputes, subject to ratifica-
tion at a public meeting by the official bodies of each party ...
[T]he agreement may be set aside only for fraud, misconduct, or
gross mistake."' 82 If the parties give their consent, further mediation
may be employed to resolve any differences which may arise from
the public meetings. 83 This provision serves an important function
because it assures that each party will consider itself bound by any
agreement which is reached, and thus secures the agreement against
challenge by either party.
Within twenty days after the Council and the district "reach ac-
cord in mediation,"' 84 the Council must serve its modified decision
on the district and the interested public and place the modified deci-
sion in its record file. "The modified decision will contain findings
and conclusions based on the record file and additional material
presented during mediation necessary to demonstrate that the modi-
fied decision is consistent with [the statutory or regulatory standards
imposed under the Coastal Management Program]."' 185
A final question which affects the stability of the mediated dis-
trict program provisions concerns their potential vulnerability to ju-
dicial attack once established as final by the Council. As noted
above, Alaska's mediation procedure specifically precludes such
[parties] thought necessary to an enlightened judgment, rather than a brief in de-
fense of the rule." Harter, supra note 48, at 483.
179. The regulation requires simply that "[i]f the mediator determines that an
accord has been reached, he or she shall direct the parties to set out in writing the
terms of the agreement." ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(5) (Apr. 1984).
180. Harter, supra note 30, at 97-98; Susskind & Weinstein, supra note 34, at 345.
181. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
182. ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(5) (Apr. 1984).
183. Id
184. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(b) (Apr. 1984).
185. Id
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attacks by the parties themselves in the absence of fraud, abuse, or
gross mistake.186 A different problem is posed by challenges brought
by interested parties who were excluded from the mediation by the
mediation statute.18 7
To the extent that legal challenges to a mediated district pro-
gram deal with procedural points not affected by the mediation stat-
ute,188 there appears to be no reason why normal judicial standards
should not apply. 89 However, it is conceivable that the courts may
also be presented with several issues unique to the mediation
process.
One such issue is whether the informal and confidential process
of mediation will yield a record which will satisfy a reviewing court
that the standards of the APA have been met, and that the negotia-
tions did not constitute impermissible undisclosed contacts under the
ex parte doctrine developed by courts reviewing rulemaking proce-
dures under the federal APA.190 Although the APA does not explic-
itly prohibit agency communications outside the formal channels of
public notice and comment,' 9' disclosure of such communications
has been held to be an implied requirement of the APA's provision
186. ALAsKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 6, § 85.170(a)(5) (Apr. 1984); cf. Harter, supra
note 48, at 483-84 (agency should accord negotiated agreement deference and pub-
lish it as a proposed rule unless there is good cause not to do so).
187. This risk appears to be an inevitable tradeoff for the advantages gained by
limiting the negotiation to the Council and district. See supra text at notes 10 1-03.
188. Different considerations may apply where nonparties to the mediation chal-
lenge the substance of a mediated agreement. See infra text at note 199.
189. For a brief overview of standards and procedures for judicial review of ad-
ministrative decisions, see Harrington & Frick, Opportunitiesfor Public Particoation
in Administrative Rulemaking, 15 NAT. Ras. LAW. 537, 562-64 (1983).
Even without any relaxation of review standards for mediated regulations,
Alaska courts may be expected to accord considerable latitude to agency decisions
dealing with complex scientific and policy issues. Discussing the standard of review
in a case challenging a state offshore oil-development leasing program under the
coastal management program standards as well as other environmental statutes, the
supreme court stated that "'in cases concerning administrative expertise as to either
complex subject matter or fundamental policy formulations,' an administrative
agency's decision will be reviewed by the court only to the extent necessary to ascer-
tain whether the decision has a 'reasonable basis."' Hammond v. North Slope Bor-
ough, 645 P.2d 750, 758 (Alaska 1982) (quoting Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906,
917 (Alaska 1971)).
Where the administrative decision "is almost entirely a policy decision, involv-
ing complex issues that are beyond [the] court's ability to decide [it will apply only a
limited review]. . . 'to ensure that [the decision] was not arbitrary, capricious, or
prompted by corruption."' 645 P.2d at 759 (citing Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 36
n.20 (Alaska 1976)).
190. See generaly Note, Ex Parte Contacts Under the Constitution andtheAdmin-
istrative Procedure Act, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 379 (1980).
191. Id at 388.
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for judicial review of agency decisions. 192
Strict application of the prohibition against ex parte contacts
has been recognized as a potential legal barrier by proponents of
regulatory negotiation, 193 who have called for specific legislation de-
claring the doctrine inapplicable to this setting.' 94 Arguably, how-
ever, the doctrine technically would not apply to Alaska's coastal
zone mediation scheme because the communications at issue will
take place between two governmental bodies rather than between a
state agency and regulated private interests. Further, while specific
communications must remain confidential, the public will be in-
formed of the existence and final tenor of the negotiations. Most
importantly, the record developed will satisfy the underlying goals of
the ex parte doctrine.
The Alaska regulations do not require preparation of a record
during the mediation process itself. Moreover, the confidentiality,
flexibility, and informal interchange which are essential in mediation
may be incompatible with the development of the type of record typ-
ical in standard administrative proceedings. 9 5 Instead, the regula-
tions provide for development of findings and conclusions sufficient
to demonstrate consistency with the substantive standards of the
CZM program. 196 The development of a pre-mediation public hear-
ing record for the mediator's use and the requirement that mediated
agreements be ratified at public meetings of the Council and the dis-
trict governing body provide further safeguards against the abuse the
record requirement and ex parte rules were designed to avoid. 197
192. Id Courts and commentators have condemned such contacts as biasing
decisionmakers, obstructing judicial review, and undermining the adversarial nature
of informal rulemaking.
193. See, e.g., Boyer, supra note 48, at 123; Harter, supra note 30, at 22 n.128; id
at 115; Stewart, supra note 70, at 1345-46.
194. See, e.g., Procedures, supra note 73, at 492; Stewart, supra note 70, at 1353.
195. See Harter, supra note 30, at 106-07 (requiring such a record would be inap-
propriate because negotiated regulations are generated by direct consensus of inter-
ested parties rather than through the development of voluminous factual material).
[T]he court should require only that the [parties] have enough information
to enable [them] to make an intelligent choice. . . .The negotiation pro-
cess guarantees that [interested parties' concerns] are addressed, thereby
eliminating the need to review the entire factual basis of the agreement.
Therefore, judicial review of the factual basis of the negotiated rule need
only consider the possibility of arbitrariness and irrationality.
Id
196. Presumably the "reasonable basis" standard of review would apply to deter-
mine the sufficiency of this demonstration. See supra note 189. The ex parte doc-
trine, if applied, might require a summary of even unsuccessful negotiations to be
placed on the record prepared for a later adjudicatory decision.
197. Relaxation of the record requirements on review of negotiated regulation
"can be justified because a representative negotiating process resulting in a consen-
sus position would provide safeguards functionally equivalent to those afforded by
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Consequently, the Alaska mediation procedure does not appear vul-
nerable to attack on the grounds that the mediated agreement will be
intrinsically unreviewable or procedurally inadequate under the
APA.
Two additional types of judicial challenge may arise. The first
would be based on the failure to comply with the procedural require-
ments of the mediation regulation (for example, failure to declare an
impasse or agree on an extension after sixty days). The statute is
silent on the consequences of such an omission. Harter argues
persuasively, however, that purely procedural shortcomings should
never be considered sufficient to invalidate an agreement. 98 The
second type of potential lawsuit would be based on the parties' fail-
ure to consider or adopt the challenger's substantive viewpoint.
Here again, Harter advocates adopting a strict rule of standing which
would allow such challenges to proceed only when challengers can
show that they either participated in the public review process at ear-
lier stages or had good cause for not doing so. 199 Given the extensive
provisions for public input in Alaska's coastal zone process gener-
ally, and in the mediation process particularly, such a restriction
would be reasonable.
V. CONCLUSION
Alaska's coastal zone mediation procedure represents an impor-
tant venture into the use of mediation to resolve difficult substantive
and administrative problems arising outside the traditional labor
context. Largely because the program is so innovative, specific devel-
opments under the law are difficult to predict. As the foregoing
analysis suggests, experience may demonstrate the need for greater
flexibility in some areas and greater specificity in others. This exam-
ination of the ramifications of a procedure which is fairly simple on
its face also illustrates the validity of experienced mediators' cau-
tions against a "'hot tub' approach. . in which the interests shed
their adversarial stance and jump into mellow cooperation simply
because the process is dubbed non-adversarial. ' '2°° Nevertheless,
Alaska's mediation provisions offer an important testing ground for
a new mediation application; and because the field is in its infancy
the existing hard look approach to judicial control. The reduced formalities re-
tained would provide for sufficient judicial control of plain illegality." Stewart,
supra note 70, at 1348 (citation omitted).
198. Hater, supra note 30, at 102-03.
199. Id at 103-06.
200. Harter, supra note 48, at 476. See also Boyer, supra note 48, at 170 (need for
thoughtful refinement of procedural techniques, sensitivity to needs and interest of
affected interests).
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this law has the potential to influence significantly the future of alter-
native dispute resolution in state government. 20 1 Alaska's mediation
procedure is also of great interest as a unique, pragmatic integration
of several theoretical models of mediation practice. Finally, by en-
acting the mediation provision, Alaska's legislature has recognized
the need for new institutional approaches to the substantive
problems of coastal zone planning and similar conflicts. In the words
of one commentator:
[T]o the extent that [the legislature] delegates polycentric, multiple
criteria problems to regulatory agencies ... some form of struc-
tured bargaining appears to comprise an essential part of any
problem-solving mechanism. Such problems are at root neither
technical nor legal but political - that is to say, they are problems
of social choice in a world of ever more limited resources. In such
a world, bargaining may do for us what litigation and law increas-
ingly cannot: it may nourish those impulses toward integration,
accommodation, reconciliation, and mutuality of interests which
an adversary society tends to stifle, but without which no society
can effectively discharge its business.202
Jane Baluss
201. See generally L. FREEDMAN, supra note 8, at IV.
202. Schuck, supra note 70, at 34.
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